Rethinking the Afghanistan War’s What-Ifs

Some of us argued in 2002 that we should make Afghanistan our fifty-first state - not primarily to benefit Afghans, but to benefit ourselves. We needed a big footprint in Afghanistan to gather intelligence about our enemies. When you're fighting an organization like Al Qaeda, you need to place your military and intelligence resources close to the scene of the fight. You can't defeat an enemy like that from a distance.

David Sanger's article, Rethinking the Afghanistan War’s What-Ifs, makes those of us who made this argument seem like military geniuses. Since that's not the case, perhaps the experts who set military policy for Afghanistan were dunces. Since that doesn't seem so likely, we have a riddle. What led to bad policy in Afghanistan after the victory there early in 2002?

The answer's not so difficult if you remember human psychology. We know the Bush administration wanted to use 9/11 as a pretext to invade Iraq. Within forty-eight hours of the attack on the twin towers, the White House wanted information that would link Hussein to the plot. When you're that set on a certain plan, when you've already committed yourself to a new war, you'll convince yourself that proper follow-up for the war you had to fight first - in Afghanistan - is not worth the candle. You'll make up arguments to show that further involvement is not worth it, just as you'll make up intelligence to show that the war you want to fight must be fought. You'll argue that nation-building in Afghanistan is a highly questionable project, and you'll define the project so as to prove your point.

But let's say the point of nation-building is not to import Western democracy to replace Afghanistan's tribal political structure. Let's say the point of nation-building is to build roads to move your trucks and supplies around. Let's say you want to place cell phone towers in the cities and on the high ground to improve your own communications, and to monitor everyone else's communications. Let's say you want to meet tribal leaders to find out which ones would like to keep Al Qaeda out of their territory. Then you have a definition of nation-building that fits your own interests. Then you have worthwhile projects you can actually accomplish.

But if you actually want to roll into Baghdad to overturn a tyrant who dissed your dad, you won't think about these practical activities. You'll define goals in Afghanistan that are dubious and unachievable. You'll gear up your military forces for a big attack and an impressive victory. That's just what we did.

Our strategic blunder in Iraq and our strategic blunders in Afghanistan are woven of the same threads.